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Abstract—In blockchain networks adopting the proof-of-work
schemes, the monetary incentive is introduced by the Nakamoto
consensus protocol to guide the behaviors of the full nodes (i.e.,
block miners) in the process of maintaining the consensus about
the blockchain state. The block miners have to devote their
computation power measured in hash rate in a crypto-puzzle
solving competition to win the reward of publishing (a.k.a.,
mining) new blocks. Due to the exponentially increasing difficulty
of the crypto-puzzle, individual block miners tends to join mining
pools, i.e., the coalitions of miners, in order to reduce the income
variance and earn stable profits. In this paper, we study the
dynamics of mining pool selection in a blockchain network, where
mining pools may choose arbitrary block mining strategies. We
identify the hash rate and the block propagation delay as two
major factors determining the outcomes of mining competition,
and then model the strategy evolution of the individual miners as
an evolutionary game. We provide the theoretical analysis of the
evolutionary stability for the pool selection dynamics in a case
study of two mining pools. The numerical simulations provide
the evidence to support our theoretical discoveries as well as
demonstrating the stability in the evolution of miners’ strategies
in a general case.
Index Terms—Blockchain, proof-of-work, mining pool, evolu-
tionary game
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction in the grassroot online project “Bit-
coin” [1], the technology of blockchain has attracted signif-
icant attentions across the academia, the industry and the
public. A blockchain network is built upon a virtual overlay
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network as a decentralized temper-proof
system for transactional record logging [2]. For permissionless
blockchains, the Nakamoto consensus protocol [1] is widely
adopted to financially incentivize the full nodes (block min-
ers) to abide by the longest-chain rule in maintaining the
blockchain state. In a blockchain network, the blockchain users
issue the digitally signed transactions between their crypto-
graphic addresses (a.k.a., wallets). Following the Nakamoto
protocol, the block miners pack an arbitrary number of such
verified transactions into a data structure, known as a candidate
block, and broadcast it to the rest of the network. A blockchain
is thus organized as a hash-linked list of such blocks and
stored distributively as the local replica on each block miner.
Following the “longest-chain rule”, at a given time instance,
the longest one among the proposed blockchain views will be
ultimately recognized by the network as the current state of the
blockchain [2]. Both the engineering practices and theoretical
studies [3] have shown that the Nakamoto protocol is able
to guarantee the persistence and liveness of a blockchain in
a Byzantine environment. In other words, when a majority
of the mining nodes honestly follow the Nakamoto protocol,
the transactional data on the blockchain are guaranteed to be
immutable once they are recorded.
In the Nakamoto protocol, the financial incentive mecha-
nism consists of two parts: (a) a computation-intensive crypto-
puzzle solving process to make Sybil attacks financially unaf-
fordable, and (b) a reward generation process to award the
miners when their published blocks are recognized by the
entire network. The crypto-puzzle solving process is imple-
mented through a Proof-of-Work (PoW) process [3], where
the miners exhaustively query a trusted random oracle (e.g., a
SHA-256 hash function) to find a string satisfying a preimage
condition based on their individual block proposals. In the
block awarding process, the first miner whose candidate block
gets accepted by the majority of the network will receive a
monetary reward for its contribution in approving transactions
and extending the blockchain by one block. Except for the
transaction fees named by the transaction issuers, the winner
in a round of the block mining competitions may also receive
an ex-nihilo, fixed-amount of award according to the token-
generation mechanism of the blockchain [1], [2].
The probability of winning a puzzle-solving competition
depends on the ratio between a miner’s hash rate (i.e., number
of queries to the random oracle per unit time) and the total
hash rate of the entire network [3]. In addition, the block
propagation time in the P2P network determines the final
result of block confirmation within one consensus round, since
only the first block propagated to the majority of the network
can be confirmed as the new head of the blockchain [4],
[5]. In practical scenarios, the chance for individual miners
to win in one round of the mining competitions has been
negligible due to the exponential growth of hash rate in the
network. As a result, the real-world blockchain networks are
dominated by the proxy nodes that represent the coalitions
of miners known as mining pools [2]. A mining pool works
as a task scheduler by dividing a puzzle-solution task into
smaller sub-tasks and assigning them to the miners according
to their devoted hash rate. By aggregating the hash rate of
many miners, the probability for a mining pool to win a block
reward becomes significantly large. Then, an individual miner
can secure its small but stable share of reward according to
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In this paper, we study the problem of mining pool selection
in a PoW-based blockchain network, where each mining pool
may adopt a different arbitrary block mining strategy [6]. By
assuming that the individual miners are rational and profit-
driven, we propose a model based on the evolutionary game
to mathematically describe the dynamic mining-pool selection
process in a large population of individual miners. Considering
the computation power and propagation delay as the two major
factors to determine the results of mining competitions, we
focus on how these two factors as well as the cost of the com-
putation resource (mainly in electricity) impact the strategies
of the individual miners for pool selection. Based on a case
study of two mining pools, we provide the theoretical analysis
of evolutionary stability for the pool-selection dynamics. Our
numerical simulation results provide the evidences that support
our theoretical discoveries and further present the experimental
insight into the impact of the arbitrary strategies on the reward
outcomes of different mining pools.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Financially Incentivized Block Mining with Proof-of-Work
We consider a blockchain network adopting the Nakamoto
consensus based on Proof-of-Work (PoW) [1]. Assume that
the network is composed of a large population of N individual
miners. For each miner, the chance of mining a new block is
in proportion to the ratio between its individual hash rate for
solving the crypto-puzzles in PoW and the total hash rate in
the network. According to the Nakamoto consensus protocol,
the miner of each confirmed block receives a fixed amount of
blockchain tokens from the new block’s coinbase and a flexible
amount of transaction fees as the reward for maintaining the
blockchain’s consensus and approving the transactions [2].
We consider that the individual miners organize themselves
into a set of M mining pools, namely, M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
We further consider that each mining pool may set different
requirement on the hash rate contributed by an individual
miner trying to join the pool. Let ωi denote the individual hash
rate required by pool i (i ∈ M), and xi denote the miners’
population fraction in pool i. Then, the probability for pool i
to mine a block in one consensus round can be expressed as:
Prminei (x,ω) =
ωixi∑M
j=1 ωjxj
, (1)
where ω = [ω1, . . . , ωM ]
⊤, x = [x1, . . . , xM ]
⊤,
∑
i∈M xi =
1 and ∀i, xi ≥ 0.
After successfully mining a block, pool i broadcasts the
mined block to its neighbors in the hope that it will be
propagated to the entire network and confirmed as the new
head block of the blockchain. However, in the situation where
more than one mining pool discover a new block at the
same time, only the block that is first disseminated to the
network will be confirmed by the network. All of the rest
candidate blocks will be discarded (orphaned). According to
the empirical studies in [4], [5], the block propagation time
is mainly determined by two factors, namely, the transmission
delay over each link and the transaction verification time at
each relaying node. For a block of size s, the transmission
delay can be modeled as τp(s)=
s
γc [4], where γ is a network
scale-related parameter, and c is the average effective channel
capacity of each link. On the other hand, since verifying a
transaction requires roughly the same amount of computation,
the block verification time can be modeled as a linear function
τv(s) = bs, where b is a parameter determined by both the
network scale and the average verification speed of each node.
Then, the average propagation time for a block of size s can
be expressed as:
τ(s) = τp(s) + τv(s) =
s
γc
+ bs. (2)
Based on (2), the incidence of abandoned (i.e., orphaning)
a valid block due to the propagation delay can be modeled
as a Poisson process with mean 1/T , where T is maintained
by the network as a fixed average mining time (e.g., 600s
in Bitcoin) [4]. Then, the probability of orphaning a valid
candidate block of size s in one consensus round is:
Prorphan(s) = 1− e−τ(s)/T = 1− e−(
s
γc
+bs)/T . (3)
From (1) and (3), the probability for pool i to ultimately win
a block mining race with a block of size si can be derived as:
Prwini (x,ω, si) =
ωixi∑M
j=1 ωjxj
e−(
si
γc
+bsi)/T . (4)
We assume that the transactions in the blockchain network
are issued with an invariant rate of transaction fees. When
the transactions are of fixed size, pool i’s mining reward
from transaction fee collection can also be modeled as a
linear function of the block size si. Let ρ denote the price
of transaction in a unit block size [5]. Then, the reward of
pool i from transaction fees can be written as ρsi. Let R
denote the fixed reward from the new block’s coinbase. Then,
the expected reward for pool i can be expressed as follows:
E{ri(x,ω, si)} = (R + ρsi)
ωixi∑M
j=1 ωjxj
e−(
si
γc
+bsi)/T . (5)
Since the process of crypto-puzzle solving in PoW is com-
putationally intensive, the rational miners also have to consider
the cost of power consumption due to hash computation in
the block mining process. Noting that the new blocks are
discovered with a roughly fixed time interval, we denote the
energy price for generating a unit hash query rate during that
time interval by p. Then, we can obtain the expected payoff
for an individual miner in pool i as follows:
yi(x,ω, si) =
R + ρsi
Nxi
ωixi∑M
j=1 ωjxj
e−(
si
γc
+bsi)/T − pωi. (6)
B. Mining Pool Selection as an Evolutionary Game
Consider that the individual miners are rational and aim to
maximize their net payoff given in (6). Then, it is nature to
model the process of mining pool selection in the population
3of individual miners as an evolutionary game. Mathematically,
we can define the evolutionary game for mining pool selection
as a 4-tuple: G = 〈N ,M,x, {yi(x;ω, si)}i∈M〉, where
• N is the population of individual miners, |N |=N .
• M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} is the set of mining pools, and
(wi, si) is the mining strategy preference of each pool
i ∈M.
• x = [x1, . . . , xM ]
⊤ ∈ X is the vector of the population
states, where xi represents the fraction of population that
choose mining pool i. X = {x ∈ RM+ :
∑
i∈M xi = 1}.
• {yi(x;ω, si)}i∈M is the set of individual miner’s payoff
in each mining pool. yi(x;ω, si) is given by (6).
We note that ωi and si form the predetermined mining
strategy of pool i. Given a population state x ∈ X , we can
derive the average payoff of the individual miner in N based
on (6) as follows:
y(x) =
M∑
i=1
yi(x;ω, si)xi. (7)
Then, by the pairwise proportional imitation protocol [7],
the replicator dynamics for the evolution of the population
states can be expressed by the following system of Ordinary
Differential Equations (ODEs) ∀i ∈ M [7]:
x˙i(t) = fi(x(t);ω, si) = xi(t)(yi(x(t);ω, si)−y(x(t))), (8)
where x˙i(t) represents the growth rate of the size of pool i
with respect to time t.
We are interested in the Nash Equilibria (NE) of game G
described by (8). Let Y (x) denote the vector of individual
payoffs for all the mining pools, Y (x)=[y1(x), . . . , yM (x)]
⊤
and let E(Y ) denote the set of NE in game G. Then, E(Y )
can be defined as follows [8]:
Definition 1 (NE). A population state x∗ ∈ X is an NE of
the evolutionary game G, i.e., x∗ ∈ E(Y ), if for all feasible
population state x∈X the following inequality holds
(x− x∗)⊤Y (x∗) ≤ 0. (9)
It is straightforward that an NE is a fixed point of the repli-
cator dynamics given by (8), namely, ∀i∈M, fi(x(t);ω, si) =
0 [7]. Then, we need to further investigate the stability of an
NE state x∗ ∈ E(Y ) for pool selection. Suppose that there
exists another population state x′ trying to invade state x∗ by
attracting a small share ǫ∈ (0, 1) in the population of miners
to switch to x′. Then, x′ is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy
(ESS) if the following condition holds for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ):∑
i∈M
x∗i yi((1−ǫ)x
∗+ǫx′) ≥
∑
i∈M
x′iyi((1−ǫ)x
∗+ǫx′). (10)
Based on (10), we can formally define the ESS as follows.
Definition 2 (ESS [8]). A population state x∗ is an ESS of
game G, if there exists a neighborhood B ∈ X , such that
∀x ∈ B−x∗, the condition (x−x∗)⊤Y (x∗) = 0 implies that
(x∗ − x)⊤Y (x) ≥ 0. (11)
Algorithm 1 Mining Pool Selection Following the Pairwise
Proportional Imitation Protocol.
1: Initialization: ∀i ∈ N , miner i randomly selects a mining
pool to start with.
2: t← 1
3: while x has not converged and t < MAX COUNT do
4: for i ∈ N do
5: j ← Rand(1,M) {Randomly selects a mining pool
j ∈M}
6: Determine whether to switch to pool j according to
the following probability of pool switching ρi,j :
ρi,j = xj max(yj(x;ω, sj)− yi(x;ω, si), 0). (12)
7: end for
8: t← t+ 1
9: end while
In Algorithm 1, we describe the strategy evolution of the N
individual miners following the revision protocol of pairwise
proportional imitation [9]. When receiving a signal for strategy
revision of choosing a new pool, an individual miner switches
from it current pool to the new pool probabilistically according
to (12). As the population size increases, the pairwise pro-
portional imitation will asymptotically lead to the replicator
dynamics described by the ODEs in (8).
C. A Case Study of Two Mining Pools
In this section, we consider a special case of a blockchain
network with two mining pools, i.e., M = 2. Let the pop-
ulation fraction of each pool be x1 = x, and x2 = 1 − x.
From Definition 1 and by solving x˙i(t) = 0, i ∈ [1, 2], we can
obtain Theorem 1 as follows.
THEOREM 1. Based on the replicator dynamics in (8), a
blockchain network of two mining pools has three rest points
in the form of (x∗, 1− x∗) with
x∗ ∈
{
0, 1,
a− b
Np(ω1 − ω2)2
−
ω2
ω1 − ω2
}
, (13)
where a = (R + ρs1)ω1e
−(
s1
γc
+bs1)/T , b = (R +
ρs2)ω2e
−(
s2
γc
+bs2)/T and 0 < a−bNp(ω1−ω2)2 −
ω2
ω1−ω2
< 1.
Proof. From fi(x(t)) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, we have
fi(x(t)) = xi(t)(yi(x(t), ai)− y(x(t)))
= xi(t)(1−xi(t))
(
a− b
N(ω1xi(t)+ω2(1−xi(t)))
−p(ω1−ω2)
)
.
(14)
Then, by solving fi(x(t)) = 0, we can obtain the three rest
points for the case of two mining pools as (x∗, 1−x∗), where
x∗ ∈
{
0, 1, a−bNp(ω1−ω2)2 −
ω2
ω1−ω2
}
. Since from any initial
state x(0) ∈ X , the rest point of (8) should stay in the interior
of X , we have the following condition:
0 <
a− b
Np(ω1 − ω2)2
−
ω2
ω1 − ω2
< 1. (15)
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Now, we are ready to investigate the evolutionary stability
of the three fixed points. In the case of x∗ = 0 and x∗ = 1,
the population state is (0, 1) and (1, 0), respectively. We know
that the two fixed points are of the similar form, since the
individual payoff functions are similar for each mining pool.
Therefore, we only need to check the case with x1 = x
∗ = 0.
Lemma 1. For game G with two mining pools, 1) The rest
point with x∗ = 0 is an ESS, if the conditions given by (16)
and (17) hold:
a− b
Nω2
− p(ω1 − ω2) < 0, (16)
(
a− b
Nω2
− p(ω1 − ω2)
)(
pω2 −
b
Nω2
)
> 0. (17)
2) If the conditions given by (18) and (19) hold, the rest point
with x∗ = a−bNp(ω1−ω2)2 −
ω2
ω1−ω2
is an ESS.
c(a(ω1 + ω2) + ω1(−2b+Npω1(ω2 − ω1)))
(a− b)
< 0, (18)
pc(−bω1 + aω2)(a− b+Npω1(ω2 − ω1))
(ω1 − ω2)
> 0, (19)
where c = a− b+Npω2(ω2 − ω1).
Proof. According to Definition 2.6 in [9], the asymptotically
stable state of the ODE system given in (8) is guaranteed to be
an ESS. When the replicator dynamics is continuous-time, it
is asymptotically stable if the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic
system at the equilibrium is negative definite, or equivalently,
if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix have negative real
parts [10]. For the replicate dynamic system given in (8), the
Jacobian matrix of the replicator dynamics in a two-mining-
pool network is
J =


∂f1(x)
∂x1
∂f1(x)
∂x2
∂f2(x)
∂x1
∂f2(x)
∂x2


∣∣∣∣∣
(x1=x∗,x2=1−x∗)
. (20)
Further, the elements in (20) can be derived as follows:
∂f1(x)
∂x1
=(1−2x1)
(
a
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)
−pω1
)
−
aω1(x1−x21)
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
−
bω2x
2
2
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
+ pω2x2, (21)
∂f1(x)
∂x2
=x1
(
pω2−
aω2(1−x1)
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
+
bω2x2
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
−
b
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)
)
, (22)
∂f2(x)
∂x1
=x2
(
pω1+
aω1x1
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
−
bω1(1−x2)
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
−
a
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)
)
, (23)
∂f2(x)
∂x2
=(1−2x2)
(
b
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)
−pω2
)
−
bω2(x2−x22)
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
−
aω1x
2
1
N(ω1x1+ω2x2)2
+ pω1x1. (24)
Based on (21)-(24), we have
1) After some tedious mathematical manipulations, the de-
terminants of the principle minors of J at x∗ = 0 should
satisfy the following conditions to guarantee the negative
definiteness of J :
det(J11)=
a− b
Nω2
−p(ω1−ω2) < 0, (25)
det (J)=
(
a−b
Nω2
−p(ω1−ω2)
)
(pω2−
b
Nω2
) > 0. (26)
2) Similarly, at x∗ = a−bNp(ω1−ω2)2 −
ω2
ω1−ω2
, the following
conditions can be obtained for the negative definiteness
of J after some mathematical manipulations:
det(J11)=
c (a(ω1 + ω2)+ω1(−2b+Npω1(ω2−ω1)))
N(a−b)(ω1−ω2)2
< 0, (27)
det(J)=
pc(−bω1+aω2)(a−b+Npω1(ω2−ω1))
N(a− b)2(ω1 − ω2)
> 0.
(28)
Then, the proof to Lemma 1 is completed.
We note that the blockchain network is comprised by a large
population of individual miners in the real-world scenarios.
Then, from Lemma 1, we can employ the asymptotic analysis
and obtain the following theorem on evolutionary stability of
the rest points.
THEOREM 2. Assume that the population size N is suffi-
ciently large. Then, neither of the rest points with x∗ ∈ {0, 1}
is evolutionary stable. The rest point with x∗= a−bNp(ω1−ω2)2 −
ω2
ω1−ω2
is an ESS if the following conditions are satisfied:{
a− b < 0,
(bω1 − aω2)(ω2 − ω1) > 0.
(29)
Proof. First, at the rest point with x∗ = 0, by Lemma 1,
we can obtain the following conditions for the Jacobian if
ω1 ≤ ω2,
lim
N→+∞
det(J11)= lim
N→+∞
a− b
Nω2
− p(ω1 − ω2) ≥ 0. (30)
Then, the Jacobian matrix is not negative definite. Alterna-
tively, if ω1 > ω2, we have
lim
N→+∞
det(J11)= lim
N→+∞
a− b
Nω2
− p(ω1 − ω2) < 0, (31)
5and
lim
N→+∞
det(J)= lim
N→+∞
(
a−b
Nω2
−p(ω1−ω2))(pω2−
b
Nω2
)<0.
(32)
Again, the Jacobian matrix cannot be negative definite. Then,
the rest point with x∗ = 0 is not an ESS. Following the same
procedure, we can show that the rest point with x∗ = 1 is not
evolutionary stable, either.
By [10], we know that any rest point in the interior of X
is an NE. Then, for the NE with x∗ = a−bNp(ω1−ω2)2 −
ω2
ω1−ω2
,
following Lemma 1, we obtain
lim
N→+∞
det(J11)
= lim
N→+∞
(a− b+Npω2(ω2 − ω1))a(ω1 + ω2)
N(a− b)(ω1 − ω2)2
+
(a− b+Npω2(ω2 − ω1))ω1(−2b+Npω1(ω2 − ω1))
N(a− b)(ω1 − ω2)2
= lim
N→+∞
Np2ω1ω2
a− b
, (33)
and
lim
N→+∞
det (J)= lim
N→+∞
p(a− b+Npω2(ω2 − ω1))
N(a− b)2(ω1 − ω2)
·
(−bω1 + aω2)(a− b+Npω1(ω2 − ω1))
N(a− b)2(ω1 − ω2)
= lim
N→+∞
Np3ω1ω2(bω1 − aω2)(ω2 − ω1)
(a− b)2
. (34)
By (33) and (34), the Jacobian matrix is negative definite if the
conditions given in (29) are satisfied, hence the NE (x∗, 1−x∗)
is an ESS. Then, the proof to Theorem 2 is completed.
III. EVOLUTION ANALYSIS
In this section, we conduct several numerical simulations
and provide the performance evaluation of the individual
miners’ pool-selection strategies in different situations. We
first consider a blockchain network with N = 5000 individual
miners, which evolve to form two mining pools (i.e., M = 2).
For the purpose of demonstration, we set the block generation
parameters as λ = 1/600, 1γc + b = 0.005, R = 1000, ρ = 2
and p = 0.01. We also set the initial population state as
x = [0.75, 0.25]. We first consider that the two pools adopt
their mining strategies with the same block size, s1 = s2 =
100, and different computation power contribution, ω1 = 30
and ω2 = 20. By Theorem 2, we know that such strategy
adaptation satisfies the condition for an ESS in the interior of
the simplex X . Figure 1(a) demonstrates the evolution of the
miners’ pool-selection strategies. According to Figure 1(b), the
strategies converge to a global ESS of (0.4, 0.6), which is in
accordance with our theoretical prediction. We also observe
that relatively fewer miners choose to join the pool requiring
a higher hash rate (i.e., pool 1) at the ESS. This is because a
higher computation power requirement will lead to an increase
in the mining cost, which exceeds the profit improvement that
the miner can obtain in that pool.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
x1
x2
(a)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) Evolution of the miners’ population states over time with two
mining pools. (b) Replicator dynamics of the pool-selection strategies and the
evolution trajectory starting from x(0)=(0.75, 0.25).
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Fig. 2. (a) Population state at the ESS vs. varying delay coefficient 1
γc
+ b.
(b) Average payoff of the miners at the ESS vs. varying delay coefficient
1
γc
+ b.
Further, we analyze the influence of the network condition
on the pool-selection strategies of the individual miners. In
Figure 2, we show the evolution of the stable population
states and the corresponding average payoff of the individual
miners with respect to varied delay coefficient 1γc + b. In the
simulation, we adopt the same mining strategies as in Figure 1.
Figure 2(a) shows that as the propagation delay coefficient
increases, more miners will tend to join the pool with a
smaller hash rate requirement (ω2 = 20). Jointly considering
the payoffs at NE shown in Figure 2(b), we know that a larger
delay coefficient leads to a higher probability of orphaning
blocks of the same size. As a result, the miners prefer to join
the pool that induces lower mining cost. We can also observe
in Figure 2(b) that the payoffs of the mining pool remain
unchanged at zero. This phenomenon can be interpreted as
a situation of market equilibrium where the demand for the
hash rate exactly meets the supply with the current settings of
reward parameters.
Finally, we consider a more general situation with four
mining pools, where each pool adopts in their mining strategy
the same block size as si = 100 (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) and different
requirement on the hash rate contribution as ω1=10, ω2=20,
ω3 =30 and ω4 =40. The evolution of the miner population
states is presented in Figure 3(a). In the considered case,
we observe that when the miners’ pool-selection strategies
converge to the equilibrium, selecting pool 1 becomes a
dominating strategy since by contributing a higher hash rate,
the profit gain is unable to cover the power consumption cost
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Fig. 3. (a) The population states evolution with respect to different delay
coefficient 1
γc
+ b, where mining strategy variables are s1 = 100, s2 = 120
and ω1 = 20, ω2 = 20. (b) Payoff evolution with respect to different delay
coefficient 1
γc
+ b.
for each miner. Then, the individual miners prefer to decrease
their dedicated hash rate since they are sensitive to the mining
cost. Figure 3(b) show that the payoffs of joining a pool
evolves from negative value to zero. Again, this indicates a
situation where the block mining business becomes a perfect
competition market with an NE payoff of zero, and no miner
can switch its pool selection without undermining some other
miner’s payoff at the equilibrium.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the dynamic mining pool-
selection problem in a blockchain network using Nakamoto
consensus protocol. We model the dynamics of the individual
miner’s pool-selection strategies as an evolutionary game. In
particular, we have considered the computation power and
propagation delay as two major factors that determine the
outcome of the block mining competition. Furthermore, we
have theoretically analyzed the evolutionary stability of the
pool selection dynamics based on a case study of two mining
pools. For the case of two mining pools, we have shown
that the blockchain network conditionally admits a unique
evolutionary stable state. Our simulation results have provided
the numerical evidence for our theoretical discoveries.
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